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Abstract
This study considers a simple newsvendor situation that consists of n retailers, all
selling the same item with common purchasing costs and common selling prices.
Groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by inventory central-
ization, which means that they make a joint order to satisfy total future demand.
The resulting newsvendor games are shown to have non-empty cores in the litera-
ture. This study investigates convexity of newsvendor games. We focus our analysis
on the class of newsvendor games with independent symmetric unimodal demand
distributions after providing several examples outside this class that are not con-
vex. Several interesting subclasses, containing convex games only, are identified.
Additionally, we illustrate that these results can not be extended to all games in
this class.
Keywords: inventory centralization, game theory, newsvendor and convexity.
JEL classification code: C71.
1This paper is also issued as Beta Research School Working Paper (WP 131). Beta is the inter-
university research school of Technische Universiteit Eindhoven and University of Twente.
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1 Introduction
It has been well studied in the inventory literature that inventory centralization leads to
cost reduction or profit increase in an environment with multiple newsvendors (see, e.g.,
Eppen (1979), and Chen and Lin (1989)). Afterwards, several papers have analyzed the
problem of allocation of the gains from inventory centralization using the tools provided
by cooperative game theory, mainly focusing on the core. Hartman et al. (2000) studied
multiple newsvendor situations and showed that associated newsvendor games have non-
empty cores under specific assumptions on demand distributions. Then Müller et al.
(2002) came with a more powerful result proving that newsvendor games have non-empty
cores regardless of the demand distributions. The same result was independently derived
by Slikker et al. (2001).
Several generalizations of the simple multiple newsvendor model considered above
have been studied in the literature as well. Slikker et al. (2005) considered a model with
nonidentical wholesale and customer prices for the newsvendors. Moreover, they incor-
porate transshipment costs in their model. They showed that the associated newsvendor
games with transshipments have non-empty cores. Afterwards, Özen et al. (2004) showed
a similar result for a multiple newsvendor situation with warehouses.
Besides the core concept, cooperative game theory provides other solution concepts for
the benefit allocation problem as well. These solution concepts haven been paid attention
to by several works dealing with the allocation of the gains from inventory centralization
in the literature. Gerchak and Gupta (1991) considered inventory centralization in the
context of a continuous review policy inventory system with complete back-ordering. Af-
ter showing that inventory centralization always results in lower cost, they compared four
simple allocation mechanisms and showed that only one of them guarantees lower cost for
every store than its stand-alone cost. Robinson (1993) extended their analysis in terms of
the core to other allocation mechanisms, i.e., the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)) and
the Lounderback allocation (Lounderback (1976)). Hartman and Dror (1996) examined
allocation mechanisms for this setting using three criteria. These are core non-emptiness,
computational ease and justifiability, which implies that the allocation of cost in the core
of the cost game corresponds to the allocation of benefits in the core of the benefit game.
Finally, we mention two papers utilizing a hybrid analysis, Anupindi et al. (2001), and
Granot and Sosic (2003). They studied a model, where different retailers make their
ordering decisions independently\non-cooperatively and transshipment of these orders
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take place cooperatively. They mainly focus on the question of what kind of allocation
mechanisms in the cooperative transshipment game might lead to joint optimal order
quantities being an equilibrium.
In this work, we study convexity of simple newsvendor games. Convex games are
well-known for having several nice properties related to solution concepts. First of all,
Shapley (1971) and Ichiischi (1981) showed that the marginal vectors of a game are the
extreme points of the core if and only if the game is convex. Besides, the bargaining set
coincides with the core. With respect to one-point solution concepts, it holds that the
Shapley value is the barycenter of the core. Furthermore, the kernel coincides with the
nucleolus (Maschler et al.(1972)) and the τ -value can easily be calculated (Tijs (1981)).
This paper fits in the literature of operations research games (OR games), which are
cooperative games arising from operations research problems. See Borm et al. (2001)
for a survey on OR games. Convexity of OR games have been paid special interest by
several authors. We name a few of them here. Hamers et al. (2005) and Borm et al.
(2002) studied convexity of games corresponding to different sequencing situations and
Granot et al. (2002) showed that extended tree games are convex which helps them to
derive algorithms to compute the Shapley value and nucleolus of extended tree games.
It is known in the literature that newsvendor games are not convex in general (see
Hartman and Dror (1997) and Slikker et al. (2001)). In this study, we focus on the
class of newsvendor games with independent symmetric unimodal demand distributions.
Several subclasses are shown to contain convex games only. Surprisingly, however, these
results cannot be generalized to the whole class. A counterexample is provided.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we give preliminaries
on cooperative game theory and introduce some notation. Furthermore, we describe
newsvendor games here to make the paper self-contained. In section 3, we focus on
newsvendor situations with independent symmetric unimodal demand distributions and
we show that their associated games are convex if the optimal fractile equals 1/2. In
section 4, we focus on newsvendor situations with normal demand distributions and we
prove that the associated games are convex. In section 5, we investigate the marginal
contribution of retailers with uniform demand distributions to small and big coalitions.
Then in section 6, we show by means of a counterexample that newsvendor games with
independent symmetric unimodal demand distributions are not necessarily convex. We
conclude the paper with some remarks in section 7.
3
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some notions from cooperative game theory and introduce
newsvendor games, some definitions and notations.
Let N be a finite set of players, N = {1, ..., n}. A subset of N is called a coalition
and denoted by S. A function v, assigning a value v(S) to every coalition S ⊆ N
with v(∅) = 0, is called a characteristic function. The value v(S) is interpreted as the
maximum total profit that coalition S can obtain through cooperation. Assuming that
the benefit of a coalition S can be transferred between the players of S, a pair (N, v) is
called a cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game). The core of a game (N, v)
is the set
Core(v) = {x ∈ IRN |∑i∈N xi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for every S ⊆ N}.
Intuitively, the core of a game can be interpreted as the set of payoff vectors for which no
coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition N . Note that the core of a game
can be empty.
Two interesting properties that a game might satisfy are superadditivity and convex-
ity. A game (or its characteristic function) is called superadditive if for any two disjoint
coalitions S and T it holds that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ). For superadditive games, it is
always attractive for two disjoint coalitions to form one big coalition. We remark that
superadditive games do not necessarily have non-empty cores. A game (N, v) is called
convex if
v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
for all i ∈ N and all S, T ⊆ N\{i} with S ⊂ T . (1)
Hence, for convex games, the marginal contribution of a player to any coalition is greater
than his marginal contribution to a smaller coalition. A game is strictly convex if all
inequalities are strict. We remark that convex games have non-empty cores.
Before introducing newsvendor games, we first introduce newsvendor situations. A
newsvendor situation is defined as a tuple (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p), where
N : Set of retailers, N := {1, ..., n};
Xi : Stochastic demand at retailer i, with E[Xi] < ∞ for every i ∈ N ;
c : Common transportation cost of goods from supplier to the retailers;
p : Common selling price of the goods at the retailers.
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Throughout the study, we assume that p and c are positive and p ≥ c. Let Fi be the
distribution function of Xi
2. Consider a retailer i ∈ N . Note that, being stand-alone,
this retailer solves a standard newsvendor problem with demand Xi, selling price p and
purchasing cost c while determining its order quantity. Consider a collection of retailers
S ⊆ N , who form a coalition and jointly determine an order quantity to satisfy their joint
demand. This stochastic demand is given by XS =
∑
i∈S Xi. Furthermore, FS denotes
the distribution function of XS.
Let xS be a realization of random demand XS and let q ∈ IR be an joint order quantity.
The profit of coalition S for xS and q is given by
rS(q, xS) = −cq + p min{q, xS} (2)
and the expected profit function of coalition is defined by
πS(q) = EXS [r
S(q, XS)].
The associated newsvendor game (N, υ) is defined as follows:
v(S) = max
q
πS(q) for all S ⊆ N. (3)
In other words, the characteristic function v assigns to a coalition the maximum expected
profit this coalition can obtain.
We remark that the expected profit function πS is a newsvendor type profit function
and coalition S solves a standard newsvendor problem with demand XS, selling price p
and purchasing cost c. Suppose that Xi for all i ∈ N are continuous and let fi and fS
denote the density functions of Xi and XS, respectively. Then, the optimal order quantity
qS of coalition S, which maximizes his expected profit function, is the one satisfying the
well-known fractile equality FS(q
S) = 1− c/p (see Silver et al. (1998) for determination
of optimal order quantity, when demand distributions are discrete and see Khouja (1999)
for a literature review on newsvendor models)3. We call 1− c/p the optimal fractile.
2In most practical applications Xi can not take negative values. However, in this work we allow
Xi to take negative values with very low probabilities to cover well known distributions (e.g., normal
distribution). Besides, negative demand can be interpreted as returns from customers.
3Since we assume that demand can take negative values, optimal order quantities can take negative
values too. In these situations, the profit function (2) is unrealistic, i.e., the retailer sells the amount
of negative order of imaginary goods to the supplier. We include these situations in the analysis for
technical reasons. But our primary interest is in the situations, where optimal order quantities are
positive.
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In this case, we can write that
v(S) = −c ∗ qS + pEXS [min(qS, XS)]














 + pqS(1− FS(qS))




















F−1S (y)dy for all S ⊆ N. (5)
The first equality follows since qS is the optimal order quantity. The third equality holds
by means of partial integration. The fifth equality follows from interchanging the axes
of integration4. The last equality holds by qS = F−1S (1− c/p). Note that v(S) is linearly
dependent on the pair (c, p), i.e., if both c and p change by a factor λ, the optimal fractile
remains unchanged and v(S) is multiplied by λ as well.
Consider a group of retailers N facing random demand (Xi)i∈N with a selling price
p. We define the following general characteristic function, which assigns a value to each





Note that for the newsvendor game (N, v) associated with newsvendor situation (N, (Xi)i∈N ,
c, p), it holds that vS(1− c/p) = v(S).
In the literature, it is shown that newsvendor games have non-empty cores in general
(Müller et al. (2002) and Slikker et al. (2001)). Moreover, newsvendor games are
superadditive.
Consider a coalition S with demands Xi, i ∈ S, that are independently distributed.
Then the distribution of XS =
∑
i∈S Xi can be determined by the well-known convolution
4We remark that FS is a continuous and weakly increasing function. Hence, its inverse might be







for any non-empty Z ⊂ S.
In this paper, we analyze the convexity of newsvendor games. We especially focus on
newsvendor situations with symmetric and unimodal demand distributions. We use the
following definitions for unimodality and symmetry.
Definition 1 A continuous random variable X is unimodal if there exists a ∈ IR such
that its distribution function FX is convex on (−∞, a] and concave on [a,∞). A con-
tinuous stochastic variable X is called strictly unimodal if it is unimodal and its density
function fX has a unique maximum at a. The distribution function FX and the density
function fX are called (strictly) unimodal as well.
Definition 2 A continuous random variable X is symmetric if there exists a ∈ IR such
that fX(a− x) = fX(a + x) for all x ≥ 0, i.e., FX(a− x) + FX(a + x) = 1 for all x ≥ 0.
Note that a = µ with µ = E[X]. The distribution function FX and the density function
fX are called symmetric as well.
Definition 3 A discrete random variable X is symmetric if there exists a ∈ IR such that
for its distribution function FX , FX(a − x) + FX(a + x) = 1 for all x ≥ 0. Note that
a = µ with µ = E[X].
From Wintner (1938), it follows that the sum of continuous random variables with in-
dependent symmetric unimodal distributions is unimodal. Moreover, by the convolution
formula, it can be easily shown that this sum is symmetric as well.
Finally, we introduce some notation. A normal distribution with mean µ and standard
deviation σ is denoted by Norm(µ, σ). Θ and θ denote the distribution function and
density function of the standard normal distribution Norm(0, 1), respectively. A uniform
distribution on range [a, b] is denoted by U(a, b). Superscript (k) of a function denotes
the kth derivative of the function.
3 Symmetric unimodal demand distributions
In this section, we first present some examples that show that newsvendor games are
not convex in general. Afterwards, we focus on newsvendor situations with independent
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symmetric unimodal demand distributions and we show that their associated games are
convex if the optimal fractile equals 1/2. Finally, we present a proposition stating that
the convexity of newsvendor games with symmetric demand distributions are symmetric
around fractile 1/2, i.e., for two newsvendor situations Γ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p) and Γ̄ =
(N, (Xi)i∈N , c̄, p) with c̄ = p− c, the associated games are either both convex or not.
Though newsvendor games have non-empty cores, they do not need to be convex even
for very simple settings. The following example considers such a setting with identical
retailers having independent symmetric discrete demand distributions.
Example 3.1 Consider newsvendor situation Γ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p), such that N =





0 if x /∈ {1, 2} ;
1
2
if x = 1;
1
2
if x = 2,
for all i ∈ N , c = 1 and p = 2. By (3), it is a straightforward exercise to determine the





1 if |S| = 1;
2.5 if |S| = 2;
3.75 if S = N.
Hence, with i = 3, S = {1} and T = {1, 2} we derive that
vΓ(S ∪ {i})− vΓ(S) = 1.5 > vΓ(T ∪ {i})− vΓ(T ) = 1.25.
Therefore, we conclude that (N, vΓ) is not convex.
3
The following example shows that newsvendor games with dependent symmetric uni-
modal demand distributions are not convex in general.
Example 3.2 Consider newsvendor situation Γ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p), such that N =
{1, 2, 3}, c = 1, and p = 2. Let X1 be uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and let X2 = X1
and X3 = 1 −X1. In other words, X1 and X2 are positively correlated, X1 and X3 are
negatively correlated, and X2 and X3 are negatively correlated.
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0.25 if |S| = 1;
0.5 if S = {1, 2};
1 if S = {1, 3} or S = {2, 3};
1.25 if S = N.
Hence, with i = 1, S = {3} and T = {2, 3} we derive that
vΓ(S ∪ {i})− vΓ(S) = 0.75 > 0.25 = vΓ(T ∪ {i})− vΓ(T ).
Therefore, we conclude that (N, vΓ) is not convex.
3
This example can easily be adjusted to cover dependent normal demand distributions.
Before focusing on newsvendor games with independent symmetric unimodal de-
mands, we present a lemma that deals with the change in profit as a result of forming a
bigger coalition.
Consider two coalitions S and T such that S, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = ∅. Let qS, qT
and qS∪T denote the optimal order quantities of coalitions S, T and S ∪ T , respectively.
Let G(S, T ) be the expected extra benefit if coalitions S and T come together and form
coalition S ∪T , i.e., G(S, T ) = υ(S ∪T )−υ(S)−υ(T ). The following lemma shows that
the change in profit as a result of forming a bigger coalition consists of the change in
cost because of ordering optimally for coalition S∪T , the expected extra revenue coming
from the exchange of excess goods to satisfy excess demand with an order size of the
sum of optimal orders of the contributing coalitions and the expected extra revenue of
ordering optimally instead of the sum of optimal orders of the contributing coalitions.
Lemma 1 Consider a newsvendor situation (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p). Let S, T ⊆ N such that
S ∩ T = ∅. Then
G(S, T ) = −c ∗ (qS∪T − qS − qT ) + p ∗ EXS∪T [(XS∪T − (qS + qT ))+ − (XS∪T − qS∪T )+]
+p ∗ EXS∪T [min((qS −XS)+, (XT − qT )+)]
+p ∗ EXS∪T [min((qT −XT )+, (XS − qS)+)].
The proof of this lemma is given in the appendix.
Our first theorem states that newsvendor games with independent symmetric uni-
modal demand distributions are convex if optimal fractile 1− c/p equals 1/2.
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Theorem 1 Let (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p) be a news-vendor situation. If the random demands
(Xi)i∈N have independent, symmetric and unimodal distributions, and additionally p =
2 ∗ c, then the associated newsvendor game is convex.
Proof: To prove this theorem, we will show that
υ(S ∪ {i})− υ(S) ≤ υ(T ∪ {i})− υ(T ) for all S,T ⊂ N, i ∈ N such that S ⊂ T ⊆ N/{i}.
Consider a coalition S ⊆ N . Since the demand distributions of the retailers in
coalition S are independent and symmetric, the demand distribution of coalition S is
also symmetric. Using p = 2 ∗ c as well, we find that the optimal order quantity satisfies






µj. Without loss of generality, we
assume that p = 1 in the remaining part of the proof.
Let i ∈ N and S ⊆ N/{i}. Then
G(S, i) = −1
2
∗ (µS∪{i} − µS − µi) + EXS∪{i} [(XS∪{i} − (µS + µi))+ − (XS∪{i} − µS∪{i})+]
+EXS∪{i} [min((µi −Xi)+, (XS − µS)+)]]
+EXS∪{i} [min((µS −XS)+, (Xi − µi)+)]]
= EXS∪{i} [min((µi −Xi)+, (XS − µS)+)]]




























































































































The first equality holds by Lemma 1 and qT = µT for all T ⊆ N . The second equality
holds since µS∪{i} = µS + µi. The fourth equality holds since ((µS + δ)− µS)fS(µS + δ)
is equal to (µS − (µS − δ))fS(µS − δ), and (µi − (µi − δ)) ∗ (1− FS(µS − (µi − δ) + µi))
is equal to ((µi + δ) − µi) ∗ FS(µS − ((µi + δ) − µi)) for all δ ∈ IR+, and fS and fi are
symmetric functions. The sixth equality follows from changing variables Q = µi− x and
y = z − µS.
Let i ∈ N and S ⊂ T ⊆ N/{i}. Then




























(FS(y + µS)− FT (y + µT ))dy

 fi(µi −Q)dQ.
So, to prove convexity, it suffices to show that FS(x)−FT (x+µT/S) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ µS.














































2 ∗ FS(x)− FS(x + µT/S − y)− FS(x− µT/S + y)
)
dy (8)
The first equality holds by
∞∫
−∞
fT\S(y)dy = 1 and FT being the convolution of FT\S and
FS. The third equality follows from changing variable z = 2µT/S−y. The fourth equality
follows by symmetry of fT/S around µT/S. Let D(x, y) be the term between parentheses
in the last equality. So,
D(x, y) = 2 ∗ FS(x)− FS(x + µT/S − y)− FS(x− µT/S + y).
Then,
D(x, µT/S) = 0 for all x,
∂D(x, y)
∂y
= fS(x + µT/S − y)− fS(x− µT/S + y) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ µS and y ≥ µT/S.
The last inequality holds since fS is unimodal and symmetric around the mean, and
x + µT/S − y is closer to µS than x− µT/S + y if x ≥ µS and y ≥ µT/S.
So, we conclude that 2 ∗ FS(x)− FS(x + µT/S − y)− FS(x− µT/S + y) is nonnegative
for all x ≥ µS and y ≥ µT/S. Since fT/S is nonnegative, (8) is nonnegative for all x ≥ µS,
which completes the proof.
2
This result is restrictive since it proves convexity only for our special case with 1 −
c/p = 1/2 (i.e., p = 2c). However, for most of the situations (e.g., newsvendor situations
with independent symmetric strictly unimodal demand distributions), the convexity is
strict at optimal fractile 1/2. Hence, for the situations with 1− c/p ≈ 1/2 (i.e., p ≈ 2c),
the associated games are also convex. Besides, p = 2c implies 100 percent profit margin.
The following proposition shows another property of games with independent sym-
metric demand distributions.
Proposition 1 Consider two newsvendor situations Γ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p) with 1− cp < 12
and Γ̄ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , c̄, p) with c̄ = p − c, where both situations have independent and
symmetric demands. Then (N, vΓ) is convex if and only if (N, vΓ̄) is convex.
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Proof: To prove the proposition we will show that the difference between marginal con-
tributions of a retailer to a bigger and a smaller coalition is the same for both situations.
Consider coalition T ⊆ N . Using the symmetry of demand, we can write that
























F−1T (z)dz − (p− 2c̄)µT
= υΓ̄(T )− (p− 2c̄)µT . (9)




F−1T (1/2 + x)dx +
a∫
0
F−1T (1/2 − x)dx = 2a ∗ µT . The fourth
equality follows from changing c = p− c̄. The last equality follows from (5) again.
Let i ∈ N and S ⊂ T ⊆ N/{i}, then from (9), it follows that
υΓ(T ∪ {i}) − υΓ(T )− υΓ(S ∪ {i}) + υΓ(S)
= υΓ̄(T ∪ {i})− υΓ̄(T )− υΓ̄(S ∪ {i}) + υΓ̄(S)
+(p− 2c̄)(µT∪{i} − µT − µS∪{i} + µS)
= υΓ̄(T ∪ {i})− υΓ̄(T )− υΓ̄(S ∪ {i}) + υΓ̄(S).
The last equality holds since µT∪{i} − µT = µi = µS∪{i} − µS. This completes the proof.
2
4 Normal demand distributions
In this section, we study newsvendor situations with independent normal demand dis-
tributions and show that their associated games are convex regardless of the optimal
fractile.5
5The result presented in this section is taken, with permission of the authors, from the unpublished
working paper Slikker et al. (2001).
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Since we would like to show convexity for all possible 1−c/p, we transfer our analysis
to a higher dimension. Consider a group of retailers N facing random demand (Xi)i∈N
with a selling price p. Using the general characteristic function (6), convexity conditions
in (1) can be transformed as follows:
vT∪{i}(y)− vT (y) ≥ vS∪{i}(y)− vS(y)
for all i ∈ N , all S, T ⊆ N\{i} with S ⊂ T and all y ∈ [0, 1]. (10)
Note that since newsvendor games are superadditive, convexity conditions with S = ∅
are already satisfied.
Let i ∈ N and S, T ⊆ N\{i} such that S ⊂ T . The so-called convexity function
associated with the convexity condition for i, S, T is defined by































Assume that demands are independent with Xi ∼ Norm(µi, σi) for all i ∈ N . Then
demand XS =
∑
i∈S Xi of a coalition S ⊆ N is also normally distributed with parameters
µS =
∑
i∈S µi and σS =
√∑
i∈S(σi)2. The following lemma derives a relation between
standard deviations of demands of several coalitions.
Lemma 2 Let N be a finite set and let Xi ∼ Norm(µi, σi) for all i ∈ N be independent
stochastic demands. For all i ∈ N and S, T ⊆ N\{i} with S ⊂ T it holds that
σS∪{i} − σS ≥ σT∪{i} − σT .
Proof: Let i ∈ N and S, T ⊆ N\{i} with S ⊂ T . Then



















= σT∪{i} − σT ,
where the last equality follows similar to the first two.
2
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Let Dµ,σ be the distribution function of normal distribution Norm(µ, σ). So, we can
rewrite the convexity function as follows:


















The following theorem states that newsvendor games with independent normal de-
mand distributions are convex.
Theorem 2 Let (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p) be a newsvendor situation with independent stochastic
demands Xi ∼ Norm(µi, σi) for all i ∈ N . The associated newsvendor game (N, v) is
convex.
Proof: In the proof, we show that convexity requirements (10) are satisfied. In other
words, we show that coni,S,T (y) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , all S, T ⊆ N\{i} with S ⊂ T and
all y ∈ [0, 1]. Let i ∈ N and S, T ⊆ N\{i} with S ⊂ T . Then, by Proposition 1, it is
sufficient to show coni,S,T (y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, 1/2] only. Without loss of generality, we
assume that p = 1.
Let con
(1)
i,S,T (y) be the first derivative of coni,S,T (y), which is given by
con
(1)
i,S,T (y) = D
−1
µT∪{i},σT∪{i}(y)−D−1µT ,σT (y)−D−1µS∪{i},σS∪{i}(y) + D−1µS ,σS(y).
Consider a normal distribution with Dµ,σ, then D
−1
µ,σ(y) = µ + kyσ, where kα is
the unique real number such that P (X < kα) = α with X having standard normal
distribution Norm(0, 1). Therefore, we can rewrite con
(1)
i,S,T (y) as follows:
con
(1)
i,S,T (y) = µT∪{i} + kyσT∪{i} − µT − kyσT − µS∪{i} − kyσS∪{i} + µS + kyσS
= ky
(
σT∪{i} − σT − σS∪{i} + σS
)
≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, 1/2]. (12)
The second equality follows by µT∪{i}−µT = µ{i} = µS∪{i}−µS. The inequality holds by
Lemma 2 and kα ≤ 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1/2]. Since coni,S,T (0) = 0 and from (12), it follows
that coni,S,T (y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, 1/2]. This completes the proof.
2
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5 Uniform demand distributions
Convexity states that the marginal contribution of a player to a coalition increases with
the size of the coalition. In this section, we investigate this property of convex games in
the class of newsvendor games with independent uniform demand distributions. First,
in section 5.1, we analyze the marginal contribution of a retailer with uniform demand
distribution to small coalitions by focusing on a special class of 3-person games with
identical, independent uniform demand distributions. Then, in section 5.2, we investi-
gate the marginal contribution of a retailer with uniform demand distribution to large
coalitions.
5.1 3-person games
In this subsection, we analyse 3-person newsvendor situations with identical, independent
uniform demand distributions and show that the associated newsvendor games are convex
regardless of the value of 1− c/p.
Consider a group of 3 retailers with identical independent uniform demand distribu-
tions U(a, b) with b > a ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we fix a = 0. Since all retailers
are identical, the demand distribution and the value of coalition S depends on the car-
dinality of S only. Let Fk be the demand distribution function of k-person coalitions.
Furthermore, let us introduce the general characteristic function of k-person coalitions





The convexity conditions in (10) can be reduced to the following condition for this
3-retailer situation:
υ3(y)− υ2(y) ≥ υ2(y)− υ1(y) for all y ∈ [0, 1].
Related with this convexity condition, we define the following convexity function on
[0, 1]:




F−13 (z)dz − 2p
y∫
0



















The second equality follows by (13).
We remark that for convexity, by Proposition 1, it is sufficient to show that con(y) ≥ 0
for all possible y ∈ [0, 1/2].





0 if x ≤ 0;
x
b
if 0 < x ≤ b;





0 if x ≤ 0;
x2
2b2





if b < x ≤ 2b;





0 if x ≤ 0;
x3
6b3













if 2b < x ≤ 3b;
1 if 3b < x.
Furthermore,











2b2(1− y) if 1
2
< y < 1.
Note that F−11 (0) and F
−1
2 (0) are set-valued. However, we assume for technical reasons
that F−11 (0) = F
−1
2 (0) = 0.
We can write the derivative of the convexity function con(y) as follows:
con(1)(y) = p
(
F−13 (y)− 2F−12 (y) + F−11 (y)
)
.
Without loss of generality, we fix p = 1 in the remainder of the document unless
stated explicitly. In the following part of this section, we deal with situations such that
0 ≤ y = 1 − c/p ≤ 1/6 and situations such that 1/6 ≤ y = 1 − c/p ≤ 1/2, separately.
The following lemma shows that newsvendor games with 3 retailers having identical
independent uniform demand distributions are convex if 0 ≤ y = 1− c/p ≤ 1/6.
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Lemma 3 Let (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p) be a newsvendor situation with N = {1, 2, 3}, Xi ∼
U(0, b) for all i ∈ N and c ≥ 5
6
p. The associated newsvendor game is convex.
Proof: To prove the theorem, we show that
con(y) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
6
.
Recall the derivative of the convexity function
con(1)(y) = F−13 (y)− 2F−12 (y) + F−11 (y).




on the interval (0, b), it has a strictly increasing inverse function. Therefore, if H(x)
is positive on the interval (0, b) then so is con(1)(y) on the interval (0, 1/6). Moreover,
H(0) = con(1)(0) and H(b) = con(1)(1/6).
Consider 0 ≤ x ≤ b, then


























































> 0 for 0 < x ≤ b. (14)
Then we can further calculate the following values:
H(0) = 0;





































A summary and conclusions can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Derivatives of convexity function
x = 0 0 < x < b x = b
H(3)(x) + +
H(2)(x) − ⇒ + +
H(1)(x) + + ⇒ − −
H(x) 0 + +
y = 0 0 < y < 1/6 y = 1/6
con(1)(y) 0 + +
In the table the second and last columns except the last row are known from the
calculations above. We fill the remaining column as follows. Cell (2, 3) is positive from
equation (14). Cell (3, 3) is first negative and then positive since limx→0 H(2)(x) < 0,
H(2)(b) > 0 and H(3)(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, b). For Cell (4, 3) we have the following
explanation: H(1)(0) > 0 and H(1)(b) < 0. Since H(2)(x) is negative first, H(1)(x) is
going down and becomes negative (starting positive) and remains negative even after
H(2)(x) becomes positive. For Cell (5, 3) we have a similar explanation: H(0) = 0 and
H(b) > 0. Since H(1)(x) is positive first, H(x) starts to increase (starting from zero)
and stays positive even after H(1)(x) becomes negative. From the fifth row, the last row
follows immediately.
Since con(0) = 0 and con(1)(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, 1/6], con(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, 1/6].
This completes the proof.
2
We use the following technical lemma to show that newsvendor games with 3 retailers
having identical independent uniform demand distributions are convex if 1/6 ≤ y =
1− c/p ≤ 1/2.
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Lemma 4 Let b > 0, then
27b [x2 − 3(x− b)2]2









(x− b) for b ≤ x ≤ 3b
2
.
The proof of this lemma is given in the appendix.
The following lemma shows that newsvendor games with 3 retailers, and identical,
independent, uniform demand distributions are convex if 1/6 ≤ y = 1− c/p ≤ 1/2.
Lemma 5 Let (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p) be a newsvendor situation with N = {1, 2, 3}, Xi ∼
U(0, b) for all i ∈ N and 1
2
p ≤ c ≤ 5
6
p. The associated newsvendor game is convex.
Proof: To prove the theorem, we show that
con(y) ≥ 0 for 1
6
≤ y ≤ 1
2
.
Recall the first derivative of the convexity function
con(1)(y) = F−13 (y)− 2F−12 (y) + F−11 (y). (15)





is strictly increasing on the interval (b, 3b/2), it has a strictly increasing
inverse function. Therefore if H(x) changes sign only once (to negative) on the interval
(b, 3b/2) so does con(1)(y) on the interval (1/6, 1/2). Moreover, H(b) = con(1)(1/6) and
H(3b/2) = con(1)(1/2).
Consider b ≤ x ≤ 3b/2, then




































Taking further derivatives, we derive that for b ≤ x ≤ 3b/2





(x3 − 3(x− b)3)3b

 ;









27b [x2 − 3(x− b)2]2
2 [3b(x3 − 3(x− b)3)] 32
. (16)
20
Considering the first term of H(2)(x), we note that





(x3 − 3(x− b)3)3b


















for b ≤ x ≤ 3b
2
, (17)
where the inequality holds since
√
(x3 − 3(x− b)3)3b ≥ √3b2 and 2x − 6(x − b) ≥ 0 for
b ≤ x ≤ 3b/2.
From Lemma 4, we know that
27b [x2 − 3(x− b)2]2









(x− b) for b ≤ x ≤ 3b
2
. (18)


























(x− b) > 0 for b < x < 3b
2
. (19)

























We summarize and conclude with Table 2.
In Table 2, the second and last columns except the last row are known from the
calculations above. We fill the remaining columns as follows. Cell (2, 3) is positive
from equation (19). Cell (3, 3) is first negative and then positive since H(1)(b) < 0,
H(1)(3b/2) > 0 and H(2)(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (b, 3b/2). For cell (4, 3) we have the following
explanation: H(b) > 0 and H(3b/2) = 0. Since H(1)(x) is negative first, H(x) is going
down and becomes negative (starting positive) and stays negative even after H(1)(x)
becomes positive. From the fourth row, the last row follows immediately.
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Table 2: Derivatives of convexity function
x = b b < x < 3b/2 x = 3b/2
H(2)(x) +
H(1)(x) − − ⇒ + +
H(x) + + ⇒ − 0
y = 1/6 1/6 < y < 1/2 y = 1/2
con(1)(y) + + ⇒ − 0








) ≥ 0. (21)
From (20), (21) and since con(1) (starting from positive) changes sign only once (to
negative) in the interval (1/6, 1/2), we conclude that con(y) ≥ 0 for 1/6 ≤ y ≤ 1/2. This
completes the proof.
2
From Lemmas 3 and 5, and Proposition 1 the following theorem follows immediately.
Theorem 3 Let (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p) be a newsvendor situation, where N = {1, 2, 3} and
the retailers face identical independent uniformly distributed demands. The associated
game is convex.
Since the problem gets more complex, it is not possible to apply the technic of anal-
ysis above to investigate situations with nonidentical uniform demands. However, we
conjecture that newsvendor games with three retailers all having independent uniform
demand distributions are still convex.
5.2 Marginal contributions to large coalitions
In this subsection, we focus on marginal contributions of a retailer to large coalitions,
where all retailers have independent uniform demand distributions. The central limit
theorem states that the distribution of the sum of n independent random variables ap-
proaches a normal distribution for sufficiently large n. Hence, for large coalitions, normal
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distributions provide us with good approximations for their demand distributions. We
consider two large coalitions and assume that they have normal demand distributions.
We show that the contribution of the retailer with uniform demand to the larger coalition
is higher than his contribution to the smaller coalition. Since the bigger coalition consists
of the smaller one and several additional retailers, the bigger coalition is assumed to have
higher mean and standard deviation.
So, consider two coalitions T and S such that S ⊂ T . Suppose that XS ∼ Norm(µS, σS)
and XT ∼ Norm(µT , σT ) with µT ≥ µS, σT ≥ σS. Furthermore, consider a retailer i with
uniform demand distribution U(0, b) with b > 0 joining these two coalitions. The differ-
ence in the contribution of retailer i to coalition T and S for optimal fractile y ∈ [0, 1] is
given by the following convexity function:














The following theorem shows that the marginal contribution of retailer i to coalition
T is bigger than its contribution to coalition S.
Theorem 4 Let (N, (Xj)j∈N , c, p) be a newsvendor situation and let (N, v) be the as-
sociated newsvendor game. Let T , S and i be two coalitions and a retailer such that
i /∈ T ⊆ N and S ⊂ T . Assume that coalition T and S have normal demand distribu-
tions Norm(µT , σT ) and Norm(µS, σS) such that µT ≥ µS, σT ≥ σS, respectively. Let
retailer i have uniform demand U(0, b). Then,
v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
Proof: To prove the theorem, we need to show that coni,S,T (y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 imply that it is sufficient to show that coni,S,T (y) ≥ 0 for
y = [0, 1/2). Since coni,S,T (0) = 0, it is sufficient to show that for all y ∈ [0, 1/2)
0 ≤ con(1)i,S,T (y) = F−1T∪{i}(y)− F−1T (y)− F−1S∪{i}(y) + F−1S (y).
Since we could not derive the inverse functions explicitly, we transfer the problem to
the following one.
Consider a y ∈ [0, 1/2). Let k < 0 be such that Θ(k) = y, where Θ is the standard
normal distribution function. Choose ∆1 ∈ IR such that FT∪{i}(µT + (k + ∆1)σT ) = y.
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In other words,
F−1T (y) = D
−1
µT ,σT
(y) = µT + kσT ;
F−1S (y) = D
−1
µS ,σS
(y) = µS + kσS;
F−1T∪{i}(y) = µT + (k + ∆1)σT .





The proof of this claim is given in the appendix.
Using Claim 1, we derive
con
(1)
i,S,T (y) = F
−1
T∪{i}(y)− F−1T (y)− F−1S∪{i}(y) + F−1S (y)
= µT + (k + ∆1)σT − µT − kσT − F−1S∪{i}(y) + µS + kσS
= ∆1σT − F−1S∪{i}(y) + µS + kσS




Therefore, showing that FS∪{i}(µS + (k + ∆1
σT
σS
)σS) ≥ y is sufficient to prove that
con
(1)
i,S,T (y) ≥ 0.



































Θ(k + ā∆1 − u)du
where b
′
= b/σT and ā = σT /σS. The first equality follows from convolution formula
(7). The second equality holds since Xi ∼ U(0, b) and XS ∼ Norm(µS, σS). The third
equality follows from the change in coordinates z = uσS and the fact that Dµ,σ(x) =
Θ((x− µ)/σ). Since σS ≤ σT , we have ā ≥ 1. Moreover, we have






Θ(k + ∆1 − u)du, (22)
where the first equality follows from the definition of ∆1 and second equality holds by
similar argument as above.
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Θ(k + a∆1 − u)du.
So we can write














where ā ≥ 1.
























∆1Θ(k + a∆1) + (b







∆21θ(k + a∆1)− (b







−∆31(k + a∆1)θ(k + a∆1)
−(b′ −∆1)3(k − a(b′ −∆1))θ(k − a(b′ −∆1))
]
. (23)
The last expression follows from θ(1)(x) = −xθ(x).













∆1Θ(k + a∆1) + (b
′ −∆1)Θ(k − a(b′ −∆1))
]













Claim 2 Consider the function m. There is exactly one a∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that m(2)(a∗) =
0. Furthermore m(2)(a) < 0 for all a ∈ [0, a∗) and m(2)(a) > 0 for all a ∈ (a∗,∞).
The proof of this claim is given in the appendix.
From Lemma 6, which can be found in the appendix as well, it follows that m(a)
a
≥
m(1) = y for all a ∈ [1,∞).
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Therefore







The last equality follows from ā ≥ 1. This completes the proof.
2
In this section, we focused on a group of retailers with independent uniform demand
distributions. We investigated two cases, where a retailer joins to small coalitions and
big coalitions. Since the normal distribution provides a good approximation for the
demand distribution of very big coalitions by the central limit theorem, we assumed
normal demand distributions for these coalitions. For both of these cases, we were able
to show that the marginal contribution of the retailer increases with the size of the
coalition as convexity suggests. However, we still do not know whether this relation
holds for medium-sized coalitions. We conjecture anyhow that newsvendor games with
independent uniform demand distributions are convex.
6 A counterexample
The results in the previous sections point towards a general result. One might conjecture
that any newsvendor situation with independent symmetric unimodal demand distribu-
tions results in a cooperative game that is convex. In this section, however, we present
an example that contradicts this conjecture.
Example 6.1 Consider newsvendor situation Γ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , c, p), such that N =
{1, 2, 3}, c = 49, p = 50, and independent stochastic demands X1 = X2 ∼ U(0, 2) and





0 if x < 0 ;
1/50 if 0 ≤ x < 2;
230/25 if 2 ≤ x < 2.1;
1/50 if 2.1 ≤ x < 4.1;
0 if 4.1 ≤ x.
Using (4), we write the value of any coalition S as follows:
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where y = 1− c/p is the optimal fractile and qS is the optimal order quantity.
















F{3}(x− z)dz = x
2
200








F{3}(x− z)dz = x
2
200








F{1,3}(x− z)dz = x
3
1200
if 0 < x ≤ 2.
Moreover, F{1,2}(x) is given by the convolution of two identical uniform distributions,
which can be found in section 4.
The optimal fractile is calculated as y = 1 − c/p = 1/50. Recall that the opti-
mal order quantity of coalition S is qS = F−1S (y). So, the optimal order quantities of




f{3}(z)F{1,2}(x− z)dz, it can be calculated that F{1,2,3}(2.4) ≈ 0.02557 >
1/50. Moreover, F{1,2,3}(2) = 1/150 < 1/50. Hence, we conclude that 2 < q{1,2,3} < 2.4.
The contribution of retailer 1 to coalition {3} is given by













































where Size(A) corresponds to the size of area in Figure 1.
The contribution of retailer 1 to coalition {2, 3} is given by




























< p(Size(C) + Size(B)),
where Size(B) and Size(C) correspond to the size of the areas in Figure 1. The last
inequality holds since (q{1,2,3} − 2)y −
q{1,2,3}∫
2
F{1,2,3}(u)du < Size(C) and Size(B) =
2∫
0




























)(2.4− 2) = 32
6000
.
The last inequality holds since q{1,2,3} < 2.4.
Hence, we derive that





> p(Size(C) + Size(B)) > vΓ({1, 2, 3})− vΓ({2, 3}).
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Figure 1: Contribution of retailer 1
7 Concluding Remarks
The demand distribution of the retailers and the optimal fractile, which is determined
by the ratio of the purchasing cost to selling price, are two important factors that af-
fect the convexity of newsvendor games. In this paper, we concentrated on a class of
newsvendor games with independent symmetric unimodal demand distributions and we
identified several subclasses to be convex. Finally, we provided a counterexample show-
ing that convexity does not hold for all games in this class. Despite this, we think that
there might still be unidentified subclasses of convex games which are not covered in this
study. There are several reasons for us to think so. First of all, in this study, we showed
that all newsvendor games with p = 2c in the class of newsvendor games with indepen-
dent symmetric unimodal distributions are convex. Furthermore, we showed that, for
the newsvendor games with normal distributions, convexity is a quite natural property
regardless of the optimal fractile. Independent symmetric unimodal distributions are
known to be well shaped and their convolution tends to approach normal distribution
quickly. Therefore, we expect the property of increasing marginal contributions as con-
vexity suggests to hold for big coalitions formed by retailers with independent symmetric
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unimodal distributions. Secondly, uniform distributions are the distributions with the
lowest kurtosis, namely 1.8 (a measure of normality, see De Carlo (1997) for a discussion
on kurtosis) among symmetric unimodal distributions, where the kurtosis for normal dis-
tributions is 3. Hence, uniform distributions are on one side furthest away from normal
distributions within this class (we remark that in Example 6.1, the kurtosis of demand
distribution of retailer 3 is larger than 21). Despite this, we were able to show the prop-
erty of increasing marginal contributions for retailers with uniform demand distributions,
when they join small and large coalitions. Furthermore, we conjecture that newsvendor
games with independent uniform demand distributions are convex.
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of Lemma 1, Lemma 4 and two claims in the proof of
Theorem 4. Furthermore, we present Lemma 6 here.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider the value of S ∪ T :
υ(S ∪ T ) = −c ∗ qS∪T + p ∗ EXS∪T [min(qS∪T , XS∪T )]
= −c ∗ qS∪T + p ∗ EXS∪T [min(qS∪T , XS∪T )] + p ∗ EXS∪T [min(qS + qT , XS∪T )]
−p ∗ EXS∪T [min(qS + qT , XS∪T )]
= −c ∗ qS∪T + p ∗ EXS∪T [min(qS + qT , XS∪T )]
+p ∗ EXS∪T [(XS∪T − (qS + qT ))+ − (XS∪T − qS∪T )+]. (24)
The first equality follows from (3). The second equality follows by adding and subtracting
the same term. The last equality follows from min(qS∪T , XS∪T ) = XS∪T−(XS∪T−qS∪T )+
and min(qS + qT , XS∪T ) = XS∪T − (XS∪T − (qS + qT ))+. In the final expression, the first
term is the purchasing cost of ordering qS∪T units, the second term is the expected
revenue if the coalition orders qS + qT units and the final term is the extra expected
revenue of ordering qS∪T instead of qS + qT .
The sales of coalition S ∪ T with order quantity qS + qT can be written as follows:
min(qS + qT , XS∪T ) = min(qS, XS) + min(qT , XT )
+ min
(
qS + qT −min(qS, XS)−min(qT , XT ),
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XS + XT −min(qS, XS)−min(qT , XT )
)
= min(qS, XS) + min(q
T , XT )
+ min
(




(qT −XT )+, (XS − qS)+
)
.
After the first equality, the first term is the sales in the local markets using local orders
and the second term is the sales if there is excess demand in one local market and
excess stock in the other. The last equality follows from the fact that if XS ≥ qS
and XT ≥ qT (XS ≤ qS and XT ≤ qT ), qS + qT − min(qS, XS) − min(qT , XT ) = 0
(XS + XT − min(qS, XS) − min(qT , XT ) = 0), and if XS ≤ qS and XT ≥ qT (XS ≥
qS and XT ≤ qT ), qS + qT − min(qS, XS) − min(qT , XT ) = qS − XS and XS + XT −
min(qS, XS)−min(qT , XT ) = XT − qT (qS + qT −min(qS, XS)−min(qT , XT ) = qT −XT
and XS + XT −min(qS, XS)−min(qT , XT ) = XS − qS).
Consequently, the expected sales of coalition S ∪ T with order quantity qS + qT is
given by
EXS∪T [min(q
S + qT , XS∪T )] = EXS [min(q
S, XS)] + EXT [min(q
T , XT )]
+EXS∪T [min((q
S −XS)+, (XT − qT )+)]
+EXS∪T [min((q
T −XT )+, (XS − qS)+)]. (25)
Hence the expected sales of coalition S ∪ T with order quantity qS + qT is the expected
sales of coalition S with order quantity qS and coalition T with order quantity qT , and
the expected sales coming from exchange of excess goods to satisfy excess demand.
Using this, we derive
G(S, T ) = υ(S ∪ T )− υ(S)− υ(T )
= −c ∗ qS∪T + p ∗ EXS∪T [min(qS + qT , XS∪T )]
+p ∗ EXS∪T [(XS∪T − (qS + qT ))+ − (XS∪T − qS∪T )+]
+c ∗ qS − p ∗ EXS [min(qS, XS)] + c ∗ qT − p ∗ EXT [min(qT , XT )]
= −c ∗ (qS∪T − qS − qT ) + p ∗ EXS∪T [(XS∪T − (qS + qT ))+ − (XS∪T − qS∪T )+]
+p(EXS∪T [min(q
S + qT , XS∪T )]− EXS [min(qS, XS)]− EXT [min(qT , XT )])
= −c ∗ (qS∪T − qS − qT ) + p ∗ EXS∪T [(XS∪T − (qS + qT ))+ − (XS∪T − qS∪T )+]
+p ∗ EXS∪T [min((qS −XS)+, (XT − qT )+)]
+p ∗ EXS∪T [min((qT −XT )+, (XS − qS)+)].
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The first equality holds by definition. The second equality holds by (24) and (3). The
third equality follows from rewriting. The last equality holds by (25).
2
Proof of Lemma 4: Let 1 ≤ z ≤ 3
2








−(z−1)) ≥ (3(z3 − 3(z − 1)3))
3
2






















≥ (3(z3 − 3(z − 1)3))3
⇐⇒ (z2−3(z−1)2)4
(3−2z)2 ≥ (z3 − 3(z − 1)3)3
⇐⇒ (z2 − 3(z − 1)2)4 − (3− 2z)2(z3 − 3(z − 1)3)3 ≥ 0.
The second expression follows from taking the square of both sides and since z3 −




(z2 − 3(z − 1)2)4 − (3− 2z)2(z3 − 3(z − 1)3)3
= 32z11 − 528z10 + 3744z9 − 15032z8 + 37986z7
−63597z6 + 72225z5 − 55836z4 + 28917z3 − 9612z2 + 1863z − 162
= 3(z − 1) + 12(z − 1)2 + 17(z − 1)3 + 28(z − 1)4 + 29(z − 1)5
−191(z − 1)6 − 286(z − 1)7 + 184(z − 1)8 + 224(z − 1)9 − 176(z − 1)10 + 32(z − 1)11
= (z − 1)7
[
3
(z − 1)6 +
12
(z − 1)5 − 286
]
+ (z − 1)6
[
17
(z − 1)3 +
28
(z − 1)2 +
29
(z − 1) − 191
]
+184(z − 1)8 + (z − 1)10
[
224
(z − 1) − 176
]
+ 32(z − 1)11
≥ 290(z − 1)7 + 115(z − 1)6 + 184(z − 1)8 + 272(z − 1)10 + 32(z − 1)11 ≥ 0.
The first equality follows from expanding the expression. The second equality follows
from rewriting using the Taylor expansion of a polynomial., e.g., d(a + h) = d(a) +
d(1)(a)h + 1/2!d(2)(a)h2 + .... The first inequality follows from replacing (z − 1)’s in the








−(z−1)) ≥ (3(z3 − 3(z − 1)3))
3
2 for 1 ≤ z ≤ 3
2
.



























































This completes the proof.
2
Proof of Claim 1: Since FT∪{i} is a strictly increasing function, it is sufficient to
show that FT∪{i}(µT + kσT ) < y and FT∪{i}(µT + (k + 12b
′
)σT ) > y to prove the claim.
Since FT∪{i}(x) < FT (x) for all x ∈ IR, FT∪{i}(µT + kσT ) < y. So it remains to show
FT∪{i}(µT + (k + 12b
′
)σT ) > y, where





















(DµT ,σT (µT + kσT + u) + DµT ,σT (µT + kσT − u)) du
b
The first equality follows from the convolution of Norm(µT , σT ) and U(0, b). The second
equality follows from b
′
= b/σT and rewriting the expression.
Furthermore,
dµT ,σT (µT + kσT + a) > dµT ,σT (µT + kσT − a) for all a ≥ 0
=⇒ DµT ,σT (µT + kσT + a)− y > y −DµT ,σT (µT + kσT − a) for all a ≥ 0






(DµT ,σT (µT + kσT + u) + DµT ,σT (µT + kσT − u)) du > yb for all a ≥ 0
=⇒ FT∪{i}(µT + (k + 12b
′
)σT ) > y for all a ≥ 0.
The first expression holds by k < 0 and a ≥ 0. The second expression holds by
DµT ,σT (µT + kσT ) = y. This completes the proof.
2
Proof of Claim 2: In the proof, we show that m(2) has exactly one positive root,






∆21θ(k + a∆1)− (b
′ −∆1)2θ(k − a(b′ −∆1))
]
= 0
⇐⇒ ∆21θ(k + a∆1)− (b
′ −∆1)2θ(k − a(b′ −∆1)) = 0
⇐⇒ ∆21θ(k + a∆1) = (b


























































The inequalities hold since k < 0 and ∆1 < b
′



















′ −∆1 > ∆1.
Since b
′ −∆1 > ∆1 > 0, k < 0 and a∗ > 0,
|k + a∗∆1| < |k − a∗(b′ −∆1)|
and
k − a∗(b′ −∆1) < 0.
Hence,
∆1(k + a
∗∆1) < −(b′ −∆1)(k − a∗(b′ −∆1)). (27)
Since a∗ is root of m(2), from (26),
∆21θ(k + a
∗∆1) = (b
′ −∆1)2θ(k − a∗(b′ −∆1)) > 0. (28)
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The inequality follows since ∆1 > 0 and θ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ IR.
From (27) and (28), it follows that
∆31(k + a
∗∆1)θ(k + a∗∆1) < −(b′ −∆1)3(k − a∗(b′ −∆1))θ(k − a∗(b′ −∆1))
=⇒ −∆31(k + a∗∆1)θ(k + a∗∆1)− (b
′ −∆1)3(k − a∗(b′ −∆1))θ(k − a∗(b′ −∆1)) > 0.





−∆31(k + a∗∆1)θ(k + a∗∆1)
−(b′ −∆1)3(k − a∗(b′ −∆1))θ(k − a∗(b′ −∆1))
]
> 0.
This completes the proof.
2
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 6 Let C : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be a 2 times differentiable function, such that
• C(0) = 0,
• There is a t∗ ∈ [0,∞) such that C(2)(t∗) = 0, C(2)(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, t∗), and
C(2)(t) > 0 for all t ∈ (t∗,∞),
• C(1) = C(1)(0).
Then C(t)
t
≥ C(1) for all t ∈ [1,∞).
Proof: To prove the theorem, we will first show that there is a t
′ ∈ (0, 1) such that
C(1)(t
′
) = C(1)(0) and t∗ ∈ (0, t′).
We know that C is continuous on [0, 1], differentiable on (0, 1). So from the mean
value theorem, there exist a t





1− 0 = C(1).
Similarly, C(1) is continuous on [0, t
′





) = C(1) = C(1)(0). From Rolle’s theorem, there exist a t̂ ∈ (0, t′) such that
C(2)(t̂) = 0. By assumption it follows that t̂ = t∗.
Knowing that C(2) starts negative, becomes 0 at t∗ and continues positive, it is obvious











≥ C(1) + (t− 1)C(1)
t
= C(1) for all t ∈ [1,∞).
This completes the proof.
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